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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAYTON CITY, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
Karl John Weihert : Appeal No. 920394-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a jury verdict and conviction in the 
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(d), this Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the circuit courts. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and final judgement 
convicting the Defendant of driving under the influence of 
alcohol ("DUI"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court must determine whether the actions of the prose-
cuting attorney in signing the information, presenting it to and 
filing it with the office of the clerk properly commenced prose-
cution of this case. 
The Court must further determine whether the affidavits of 
the certified breath test technician and the breath testing 
1 
supervisor satisfy the legal requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44.3 and the Utah rules of evidence and procedure governing the 
admissibility of affidavits. 
In making these determinations, the Court will examine the 
trial court's interpretation of pertinent statutory authority and 
the trial court's determination of the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavits. "Questions of . . . statutory interpretation are 
matters of law, not of fact; the trial court's ruling is 
therefore a question of law that [the Court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (UtahApp. 
1991); No particular deference is given to the trial court's 
interpretation. Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 
7 39 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033,1038 (Utah 1989)); See also State v. Swapp, 155 Utah 
Adv. Rep 25 (Utah App. 1991); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 
1136 (Utah 1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Utah Const. art. I. § 13. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-21. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a). 
Utah R. Evid. 902. 
Utah R. Evid. 100 5. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant has entered this appeal from a jury 
verdict and conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol 
("DUI"). The matter came on for trial May 20, 1992. At trial, 
Defendant/Appellant made a motion to dismiss on the basis that 
the Information had been improperly filed. The Court allowed the 
trial to go forward over Defendant/Appellant's objection after 
finding that the Information had been filed in compliance with a 
newly enacted statute and after taking precautionary, curative 
steps. 
During the course of the trial Plaintiff/Appellee offered 
into evidence affidavits of a certified breath technician and the 
custodian of the records. Defendant/Appellant objected to the 
admission of the affidavits on the basis that the affidavits 
contained hearsay and conclusions and therefore did not meet the 
necessary requirements under the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court overruled defense counsel's objections finding that 
the affidavits met the standards for admissibility set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3. 
Defendant/Appellant appeals from the trial court's rulings 
on these two issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant/Appellant was arrested December 22, 1991 on 
the charge of DUI pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. opfen-
dant/Appellant was booked in Davis County Jail and issued DUI 
Summons and Citation Number D108720. (Trial Court Record, p. 6) 
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(hereinafter "Tr. rec"). The Defendant was released from jail 
by pre-trial services December 23, 1992 (Tr. rec. p. 9). A copy 
of the summons and citation was filed with the Second Circuit 
Court, Layton Department, December 24, 1992. (Tr. rec. p. 1). 
Defendant/Appellant's first personal court appearance was at 
the pretrial conference held April 1, 1992. The matter was 
scheduled for jury trial May 20, 1992. (Tr. rec. p. 1). 
A formal Information was filed May 15, 1992 charging Defen-
dant/Appellant with DUI, a class "B" misdemeanor.1 (Tr. rec. p. 
1) (Trial Transcript Record, p. 18)(hereinafter flR.fl). In filing 
the Information the prosecuting attorney signed, presented and 
filed the information in the office of the clerk. The 
Information was subscribed by court clerk B. Love. (Tr. rec. p. 
18). The Information was not sworn before or presented to a 
magistrate at the time of filing. (Tr. rec. p. 18, R. p. 30). 
The matter came to trial May 20, 1992 at which time both 
parties indicated their readiness to proceed. Following jury 
voir dire and impanelment, the Defendant/Appellant made a motion 
to dismiss on the basis that the Information had not been sworn 
to before and subscribed by a magistrate. (R. 29). Plain-
tiff/Appellee explained how the Information had been filed and 
referred to the new statute governing the filing of informations. 
(The statute was later to be identified as Utah Code Ann. 77-2-
*The case was filed as a class "B" misdemeanor p'n^j^ni. to the 
penalties for DUI set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 4 1-6-44 ( 3 ) ( a ) . The 
Information formalized the information on the citation. There were 
no additions to or changes in the allegations set forth in the 
citation. 
4 
1.1.) The Court acknowledged the existence of the new statute 
and took notice that the citation itself had been timely filed. 
(R. 30). The Court further agreed to subscribe the new rule in 
the event "there is a problem with prior offenses." (R. 30) The 
Court found that the statute affecting the procedure for filing 
informations made procedural changes only. (R. 30-31) The Court 
then had the prosecuting attorney, counsel for the Plain-
tiff/Appellee, sign the information under oath and subscribed it 
thereto. (R. 32). 
The trial proceeded with the testimony of the arresting 
officer. During the officer's testimony regarding the intoxili-
zer instrument Plaintiff/Appellee offered Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, 
affidavits of the certified breath test technician and the 
custodian certificate. Counsel for Defendant/Appellant objected 
to the admission of the affidavits on the basis that the affida-
vits did not meet the appropriate criteria for admissibility. (R. 
108-119, 124-127). Plaintiff/Appellee objected to the Court's 
allowing the Defendant/Appellant to argue his objection as the 
issue was not timely raised under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. (R. 108). The Court did not rule on the 
timeliness of Defendant/Appellant's objection but did overruled 
his objections, making the specific findings required for 
admission of the affidavits as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44.3. (R. 127-131). The affidavits were admitted into 
evidence. (R. 132-33). 
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At the conclusion of the trial and after deliberation the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Information was filed in accordance with statutory 
requirements. The statutory requirements are consistent with the 
pertinent rules of procedure. The state constitutional section 
cited by the Defendant/Appellant is inapplicable in that it 
pertains only to grand jury proceedings. 
The affidavits introduced as evidence to show the reliabili-
ty of the breath test machine qualify under the statutory hearsay 
exception established in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44..3 and are 
legally and factually sufficient to meet statutory and 
evidentiary requirements for admissibility. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INFORMATION WAS PROPERTY FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-21 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
(1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation 
filed with the magistrate may be used in lieu of an 
information . . . . 
(2) If the person cited fails to appear. . . , or 
pleads not guilty to the offense, or does not deposit 
bail on or before the date set for his appearance, an 
information shall be filed and proceedings held in 
accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and all 
other applicable provisions of this code, which infor-
mation shall be deemed an original pleading; . . . the 
person cited may by written agreement waive the filing 
of the information. . . . 
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Utah Code Ann, § 77-7-21 (1990). Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
302, "a prosecution for . . . a misdemeanor other than negligent 
homicide shall be commenced within two years after it is commit-
ted . . . ." 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states as 
follows: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall 
be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by 
a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a). In addition, Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states the following: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prose-
cutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction 
shall be commenced by the filing of an information or 
the return of an indictment. Prosecution by informa-
tion shall be commenced before a magistrate having 
jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been com-
mitted unless otherwise provided by law. 
U.R.Crim.P. 5(a). 
Article I, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution cited by 
Defendant/Appellant is inapplicable. That section pertains only 
to grand jury proceedings. Section 13 provides that "[o]ffenses 
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate . . . . Utah Const, art. I, § 13. An indictment is 
"an accusation in writing presented by a grand jury to the 
district court charging a person with a public offense." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-3(2) (1990). 
Therefore, in summary, absent written waiver from a 
Defendant, an information is required to commence prosecution and 
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prosecution for a misdemeanor offense must be commenced within 
two years from the date of the offense. The information must be 
sworn to and subscribed by a magistrate "unless otherwise 
provided by law." U.R.Crim.P. 4(a ) , U.R.Crim.P. 5(a). 
The 1992 Legislature enacted an additional section to the 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure which provides another method for 
filing informations. The newly-enacted section reads as follows: 
The prosecuting attorney shall sign all informa-
tions. The prosecuting attorney may: 
(1) sign the information in the presence 
of a magistrate; or 
(2) present and file the information in 
the office of the clerk where the prosecution 
is commenced upon the signature of the prose-
cuting attorney. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1. (Supp. 1992). Section 77-2-1.1 became 
effective April 27, 1992. See 1992 Utah Laws 33.2 
2Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1 became effective four 
months after Defendant/Appellant's arrest, it still applies to the 
proceedings against him as it is remedial in nature. A statute is 
remedial when it relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and 
does not affect a substantive or vested right. Camer v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 52 Wash. App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988). 
Legislation which is remedial in nature is to be liberally 
construed to effectuate the purpose for which it was enacted. 
Gonzales v. Callison, 9 Kan. App.2d 567, 683 P.2d 454 (1984). 
In passing section 77-2-1.1 the legislature clearly intended 
to create a less cumbersome filing procedure for misdemeanor 
prosecutions. It is well established that 
[d]espite the existence of some contrary authority, 
remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or 
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away 
vested rights, do not normally come within the legal 
conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule 
against the retrospective operation of statutes. . . . 
In the absence of any saving clause a n°w law 
changing a rule of practice is generally regaided as 
applicable to all cases then pending, . . . 
73 Am.Jur.2d. 3 54 
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The prosecution of the Defendant/Appellant was commenced by 
the filing of the information on May 15, 1992—nineteen days 
after the effective date of Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1 and less 
than two years from the date of commitment of the alleged of-
fense—and was therefore commenced in the manner prescribed by 
law.3 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE CUSTODIAN OF THE RECORDS AND THE 
CERTIFIED BREATH TEST TECHNICIAN WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.3 AND UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Affidavits of the Breath Test Technician 
Defendant/Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3, but challenges the legal 
Sometimes the rule is stated in the form that when 
a statute deals with procedure only it applies to all 
actions - those which have accrued or are pending and 
future actions. . . . 
73 Am Jur 2d. 354 n.42. 
3The information was filed five months after Defen-
dant/Appellant's arrest and only five days before trial. Counsel 
for Defendant/Appellant did not receive a copy of the Information 
until the morning of trial. (R. 29) Although the issues of speedy 
trial and prejudice are implicated, Defendant did not raise these 
issues at trial and therefore has not preserved them on appeal. 
Therefore this Court "will not consider them." Roosevelt City v. 
Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 739 n.2 (Ut.App. 1991) citing State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 71, n.2 (Utah 1990). Furthermore, Under Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). State v. Johnson, 771 P,2d 
1071 (Utah 1989) (court will not reverse a conviction unless the 
error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a 
more favorable result for the defendant.) Defendant has made no 
showing of prejudice as a result of the way the Information was 
filed. 
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sufficiency of the breath test technician's and supervisor's 
affidavits and the trial court's findings that the affidavits 
meet the requirements for admissibility under Utah Code Ann, §41-
6-44,3. Defendant/Appellant argues that the affidavits contain 
hearsay and conclusions and are therefore inadmissible under Rule 
81 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized Section 41-6-44.3 as a statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule. Hall, Id. The Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Hall has since been consistently followed and 
reaffirmed by this Court. Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 
(Utah App. 1987); Bountiful City v. Maestes, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah 
App. 1990); Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
The Court, in Hall, found that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 
was 
a codification of the findings necessary to establish a 
proper foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer 
evidence. It is a legislative recognition of the 
universal acceptance of the reliability of such evi-
dence . 
Hall, Id. at 1320. However, the Court made it clear that 
prior to the acceptance of those affidavits . . . [the 
statute] requires an affirmative finding by the trial 
court that (1) the calibration and testing for accuracy 
of the breathalyzer and the ampoules were performed in 
accordance with the standards established by the Com-
missioner of Public Safety, (2) the affidavits were 
prepared in the regular course of the public officer's 
duties, (3) that they were prepared contemporaneously 
with the act, condition or event, and (4) Hie "source 
of information from which made the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate 
their trustworthiness." 
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Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3). 
In Maestes, this Court ruled that the trial court must make 
specific findings set forth in Hall on the record in order for 
the affidavits to qualify for the statutory hearsay exception set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3. Maestas, 788 P.2d at 1065 
(citing Hall, 663 P.2d at 1320 n.4.) 
The trial court made the requisite Hall findings in the case 
before the Court. The trial court found as follows: 
In looking at these document, I—they appear that the 
calibration and testing of the machine was done pursu-
ant to the standards established by the Commissioner of 
Public Safety, if I admit Koorings affidavit [the 
custodian's certificate] in, and then the other affida-
vit of Ron Ellsworth [breath test technician's affida-
vit}, and that, I believe, is the intent of the stat-
ute. And that these affidavits were prepared in the 
regular course of these public officers' duties and 
that they were prepared contemporaneously with the act, 
condition or event that they purport to be certifying 
to. And in reasonable proximity to those times finding 
that specifically the one affidavit was not signed 
until a day later by Ronald Ellsworth, he asserts that 
he did the test on January 20th at 9:40 a.m. but did 
not swear to that until January the 21st . . . . 
I further find that the source of this information 
from which made, and the method and circumstances of 
the preparation are such as to indicate trustworthi-
ness. 
(R. 130-31). 
The trial court's findings of fact were correct and should 
not be set aside. A review of the standards set forth by the 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety shows that 
the testing procedures as set forth on the face of the breath 
test technician's affidavits do, in fact, conform tn those 
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standards.4 The affidavit states on its face that the 
information contained therein was prepared contemporaneously with 
the instrument check and in the course of the technician's 
regular duties. There is nothing on the face of the documents 
suggesting a lack of trustworthiness.5 
Defendant/Appellant makes reference to the following two 
statements on the technician's affidavit which he considers 
conclusions: 
2. This was done according to the standards estab-
lished by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of 
Public Safety. 
* * * 
4Utah Admin. R. 735-500-5(4)(1991) states as follows: 
The specificity of the procedure shall be adequate 
and appropriate for the reasonable analysis of breath 
specimen for the determination of alcohol concentration 
in law enforcement. The instrument function to be 
checked shall include, but not necessarily be limited to 
the following: 
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series. 
(a) electrical power. 
(b) operating temperature. 
(c) internal purge. 
(d) zero set. 
(e) printer deactivation. 
(f) fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), 
(g) known reference samples. 
(h) reads in grams of alcohol per 210' liters of breath, 
5Defendant/Appellant makes reference to the fact that the test 
record for January 20, 1992 was sworn before a notary public on 
January 21, 1992, one day after the test was made. The trial court 
made the specific finding that in itself did not show a lack of 
trustworthiness. (R. 130). Furthermore, a closer review of the 
affidavit shows that the breath test technician signed the test 
record and affidavit twi ce--presumably ^nr-^ on Jarm^rv 2 0, 1992, 
when he executed the affidavit and again when he attested, under 
oath to the truthfulness of the contents of the affidavit. 
12 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
* * * 
Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
Neither of these referenced statements are conclusions. These 
statements are facts of which the affiant, the certified breath 
test technician, had personal knowledge. Therefore, the affida-
vit meets the requirements of Rule 81 Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure cited by Defendant. 
The affidavits of the certified breath test technician 
offered by the prosecution and admitted into evidence met the 
requirements set forth in Murray City v. Hall, and were therefore 
properly admitted by the trial court. 
Custodian Certificate 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Hall addressed the affidavits 
of the breath test technician and did not directly rule on the 
admissibility of the custodian's affidavit. However, in Maestes, 
this Court found that 
Hall stated that affidavits proving the accuracy of 
breathalyzer equipment must "show on their face that 
the affiants . . . attest from their own personal 
knowledge." JEd. We find that both affidavits [of the 
custodian and the breath test technician] comply with 
the personal knowledge requirements. 
The breath testing supervisor signed his name to 
the custodian affidavit, listed the intoxilyzer serial 
number, and filled in the date upon which the test was 
completed. The custodian affidavit used the term "I" 
indicating that the breath testing supervisor personal-
ly attested to the information contained in the affida-
vit. . . . 
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Maestas, 788 P.2d at 1065 (citing Hall, Ld.). The ruling of the 
Court impliedly recognizes that the affidavit of the breath 
testing supervisor is a necessary part of the foundation required 
for admission of the affidavits of the breath test technician and 
the breath test results. As a necessary part of the foundation, 
the affidavit of the breath testing supervisor is entitled to the 
statutory hearsay exception set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.3. 
Although the custodian affidavit is entitled to the hearsay 
exception under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3, the affidavit must 
still comply with the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 1005 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence states as follows: 
The contents of an official records . . . if 
otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified 
as correct in accordance with Rule 902 . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 1005. Rule 902(4) regarding certified copies of 
public records requires the following: 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is not required with respect 
to the following: 
• * * 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of 
an official records or report . . . certified as 
correct by the custodian or other person authorized to 
make the certification, by certificate complying with 
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying 
with any law of the United States or of this state. 
U. R. Evid. 902(4). Subsection (2) of Rule 902 reads as follows: 
(2) Domestic public documents not under; se^ vl A 
document purporting to bear the signature in his offi-
cial capacity of an officer or employee of *ny f^tatM, 
[is admissible] if a public officer having a seal and 
having official duties in the district or political 
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subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under 
seal that the signer has the official capacity and that 
the signature is genuine. 
The custodian certificate was sworn before a Notary Public 
who certified "under seal" that Sgt. Kooring, the breath testing 
supervisor, was "an officer and employee of the Department of 
Public Safety of the State of Utah and is the legal custodian of 
the intoxilyzer affidavits of said department. The notary public 
further certified that "his signature affixed hereto is genuine." 
Therefore the requirements of Rules 902 and 1005 were met and the 
custodian certificate was properly admitted as foundation for the 
admission of the affidavits of the certified breath test 
technician. 
Defendant/Appellant argues that the following statements 
contained in the affidavit of the breath testing supervisor are 
either hearsay or conclusory in nature: 
1. I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah 
Highway Patrol and the official keeper of and 
responsible for the maintenance check records 
of the breathtesting instruments maintained 
in the State of Utah. 
* * * 
3. The attached tests were done before and after 
the date of December 22, 1991. 
However, the affiant, Sgt. Christian Kooring, also states as 
follows: 
5. I am competent to testify and have personal 
knowledge of the matters alleged in this 
affidavit. 
15 
The statements referred to by Defendant/Appellant are 
neither conclusions nor hearsay, but are facts of which the 
affiant has personal knowledge. 
The custodian certificate is a necessary document for a 
proper foundation for the admission of the affidavits of the 
certified breath test technician. The custodian certificate 
meets all the legal requirements of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
and is entitled to the same hearsay exception set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3. Therefore, the custodian certificate was 
properly admitted into evidence by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of the Defendant/Appellant was commenced in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1 and other statutory and 
procedural requirements and was therefore commenced in the manner 
prescribed by law. 
The affidavits of the certified breath test technician 
evidence met the requirements set forth in Murray City v. Hall, 
and were therefore properly admitted by the trial court. The 
custodian certificate is a necessary document for a proper 
foundation for the admission of the affidavits of the certified 
breath test technician and is therefore entitled to the same 
hearsay exception set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3. 
Furthermore, the custodian certificate meets all the legal 
requirements of the Utah Rules of Evidence and was properly 
admitted into evidence by the trial court. 
16 
Base one the foregoing, Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully 
requests that the ruling's of the trial court be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of December, 1992 
tAU # ?//» 
ne H. Eller 
:on City Prosecutor 
ftorney for Layton City 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed to counsel for 
Defendant/Appellant, D. Bruce Oliver, 180 South 300 West, Suite 
210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on this 28th day of December, 
1992, 
d f/A^ 
ene H. El ler 
fyton City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Layton City 
Pla in t i f f /Appel lee 
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A D D E N D U M 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Utah Const, art. I, § 13. [Prosecution by information or 
indictment - Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as pre-
scribed by the Legislature. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is materi-
al to prove that a person was operating or in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memo-
randa or records of acts, conditions, or events to prove 
that the analysis was made and the instrument used was 
accurate, according to standards established in Subsection 
(1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in 
the regular course of the investigation at or 
about the time of the act, condition, or 
event; and 
(b) the source of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances of 
their preparation indicate their trustworthi-
ness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) 
have been met, there is a presumption that the test results 
are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 Time limitations for prosecution of 
offenses — Commencement of prosecution. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution 
for: 
* * * 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent 
homicide shall be commenced within two years 
after it is committed. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing pre-
sented by a grand jury to the district court charging a 
person with a public offense. 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, 
charging a person with a public offense which is presented, 
signed, and filed in the office of the clerk where the 
prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 77-2-1.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1 Signing and filing of information. 
The prosecuting attorney shall sign all 
informations. The prosecuting attorney may: 
(1) sign the information in the presence of 
a magistrate; or 
(2) present and file the information in the 
office of the clerk where the prosecution is 
commenced upon the signature of the prosecuting 
attorney. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-21. Proceeding on citation - Voluntary 
forfeiture of bail - Information, when required. 
(1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation 
filed with the magistrate may be used in lieu of an 
information to which the person cited may plead guilty 
or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be 
forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a potson may 
voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being 
required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or less. 
Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be entered as a 
2 
conviction and treated the same as if the accused 
pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person 
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Utah Admin. R. 735-500-5(4) Instrument Certification. 
The specificity of the procedure shall be adequate 
and appropriate for the reasonable analysis of breath 
specimen for the determination of alcohol concentration 
in law enforcement. The instrument function to be 
checked shall include, but not necessarily be limited 
to the following: 
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series. 
(a) electrical power. 
(b) operating temperature. 
(c) internal purge. 
(d) zero set. 
(e) printer deactivation. 
(f) fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), 
(g) known reference samples. 
(h) reads in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of brea 
Utah R. Crinu P. 4(a) 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall 
be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by 
a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
Utah R, Crinu P. 5(a) 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prose-
cutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction 
shall be commenced by the filing of an information or 
the return of an indictment. Prosecution by informa-
tion shall be commenced before a magistrate having 
3 
jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been com-
mitted unless otherwise provided by law. 
Utah R. Evid. 902 (in pertinent part) 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is not required with respect 
to the following: 
* * * 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A 
document purporting to bear the signature in his offi-
cial capacity of an officer or employee of any entity 
included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a 
public officer having a seal and having official duties 
in the district or political subdivision of the officer 
or employee certified under seal that the signer has 
the official capacity and that the signature is genu-
ine . 
• * * 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of 
an official records or report or entry therein, or of a 
document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and 
actually recorded or filed in a public office, includ-
ing data compilations in any form, certified as correct 
by the custodian or other person authorized to make the 
certification, by certificate complying with Paragraph 
(1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law 
of the United States or of this state. 
Utah R. Evid, 1005 
The contents of an official records, or of a 
document authorized to be recorded or filed and actual-
ly recorded or filed, including data compilations in 
any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved by 
copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 
or testified to be correct by a witness who has com-
pared it with the original. If a copy which complied 
with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the 
contents may be given. 
4 
LAYTOI,1 CIRCUIT CPIWT 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, DAVIS COUNTY 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT W:rl5 3 s 5 p ; ; F 3 2 
LAYTON CITY, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KARL J, WEIHERT 
PSC 1 Box 221 
Hill Air Force Base, UT 84056 
DOB: 11/22/63 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 912007007TC 
The undersigned, Janene H. Eller under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed, in the above-
named county, the crime of DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL, a Class B Misdemeanor, at the vicinity of 2100 North 
Main, Layton, Utah 84041 on or about December 22, 1991, at about 
6:29 p.m., in violation of Section 41-6-44 , Layton Municipal Code. 
The act or acts of defendant constituting the crime were as 
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant 
unlawfully 
operated and/or had actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state while under the influence of alcohol 
to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of 
safely driving said vehicle and/or driving with a blood 
or breath alcohol content of .08% weight or greater. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witness: Donald J. Keith. 
6&el 
i/fifc 7J- fMf^)foi**utf&g^ 
Layxon City Prosecutor 
^ Subscribed and—swum—be—before—ave this / ^ day of 
^m^t^y, 1992. 
t ^4A \ £^ -A- - is^AcA t\AJ> LUz— 2fc-k ^^d^a *£ kuu* . / ^ i — -
NORMAN H. 8ANGERTER. GOVERNOR 
v.\ ^,y 
O. OOUGL^S 8O0RER0. COMMISSIONER 
BRANT JOHNSON. OEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and 
the official keeper of and responsible for the maintenance check 
records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in the State of 
Utah. 
2. Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance 
and certification for tha Intoxilyzer serial number 
located at /^^ <^7d7J A'*- As * of which are kept on file by 
me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, 
Department of Public Safety and in accordance with the current 
regulations of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
3. The attached tests were done before and after the date 
of ^ ^ > ^ t ^ ^ M ^ 1 9 < y / . 
4. The breathtest technicians(s) whose signature(s) appear on the 
attached affidavit(sJare certified by the State of Utah and 
has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the 
Department of Public Safety: 
Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification 
course and/or renewal course; 
Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's 
course offered by Indiana University, or an equivalent course of 
instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol Testing Program; 
Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument 
Manufacturer's Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the 
instruments in use in the State of Utah or is qualified by nature of 
his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those instruments; 
Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours 
related training each calendar year. 
5. I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of 
the matters alleged in this affjldj 
Sgt. Christiaa~rr~Kooring 
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
mix 
ON THE^</ DAY OF^}<a^.» 19 PX PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE 
ME, CHRISTIAAN KO0RING, WHO BEING DULY SWORN BEFORE ME EXECUTED 
THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I CERTIFY J ^ ^ A I D PHBaMkfRYPUBLIC 
IS AN OFFICER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT! 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODI 
INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT AN? 
SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE. 
NOTA^YWBLIC: CjM^1 _ 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES °y/2 /$& RESZ&ING AT 
SAFgEflOLYN JOHN 
5757 South 320 West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
~bruary15.1993 
TEOFUTAH 
to 
yiAH_DEPT^OF_PUBLIC_SA^
 (A) 
I/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial n u m b e r ^ . Q l ^ ^ ^ 
located atJ^TZW_jQUXFjJgjQ was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on })&£&&&~L%-l^_ft/____atJJJirilM. 
2. This was done by a currently certified techinician and according 
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety, 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were 
made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the 
matters alleged in this affidavit. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
lectrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
( i/f Temperature check (Ready light is on) . 
(
 K^ Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds. 
( ^ Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly)... 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
( *-0 Fixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting).... 
( ,/) Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest)... 
( </? Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath. . . J. 
REPAIRS REQUIRED (Explain) " I ^ Z f e ^ 
( is^T The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded. . ( c/j 
( v/j The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly ( iS) 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on_XiQU£tYiEygfi___l!^  19jX/_-
CERTJLW-EJ) BREATIL.TEST TECHty?CIAN(S) 
YES 
(«/? 
( ^) 
( -O 
<•$ 
( ^r 
( ) 
NO 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY 0F^2$^/___) I/We, on onth, sfe^fte^hat^th^ ^ °1r,eS°A9^ *s true 
Subscribed and sworn before me this . / 7 day of ,/£?.(*.£. 19_^_ 
C i t y o f R e s i d e n c e _ _ J > ^ ^ ^ j ^ : ^ ' 
N o t a r y P u b l i c Coun ty of R e s i d e n c e / v f ? y / i 
^y commiss ion e> NOTARY PUBLIC! 9 
COLLEN ABATE 
1100 North 390 West 
Sunsat m»»i turm? 
in 
yXAH_DEPT^_OF_PyBLICJ>AFETY_ (A) 
I/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number 
located at JL/vtliiO^ P^  was properly checked by me/u< 
the course of official duties, on JjstPu£&/--£Q ^^ft^^^Jli^llQ^H 
2. This was done by a currently certified techinician and according to 
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were 
made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the 
matters alleged in this affidavit, 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: YES 
(i/) Electrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) ( ^ 
i%//) Temperature check (Ready light is on) ( J)r 
( \/*) Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds 
( <y>f Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly).. 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on).... 
( i/O Fixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting)... 
NO 
( ^ 
< <r 
( i / ) 
( *si 
( *0 Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest).. 
( i^f Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath.. .A { ^ ( ) 
REPAIRS REQUIRED(Explain) !^Xl&^-- ( ) ( </( 
( *0 The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded ( <^J 
( i/) The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly ( *0 
Last prior check of this instrument was done onJJE&fHXfyetL (9+ 193J_* 
CERTH4E*n BREATH JtESy TECHNICIANS) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF^jQ^^^tt) I/We, on oath, strtfETT h^atp t)x^ j£?rego}$g is true, 
V^ 
Subscribed and sworn before me this £)J day of 192.2-' 
Li^kij—XIll^iLi^ c i ty o f Residence ^V^J^L 
u*4-~>~*. D W ( W I ; ^ « f!n ii nfv nf Residence ./*)/iv. *r\ $ K. Notary P 
t^^^^W^^ . 
County of Residence ^k^rfiL PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
S ^} 19^.3 • ^^ EXHIBIT NO. J p . 2 2 -
CASE NO. . UfflfolC 
..w^ i.ii^  v-j-iv^wj-x \ - u u m — JUA1 x'ON 
Defendant Citation: D108720 
THURSDAY OCTOBER 8, 199 
9:18 A 
LPD Case: 912007007 TC 
WEIHERT, KARL JOHN 
PSC 1 
HILL AFB 
Traffic Court Case 
Judge: S. MARK JOHNSON 
UT 
OTN #: 565475 
Charges 
Violation Date: 12/22/91 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 41-6-44 
Sev: MB Attrib: L 
Bail 
910.00 
P in room 2 with SMJ 
1 WK CONTINUANCE TO 
Proceedings 
12/24/91 Case filed on 12/24/91. 
RELEASED PRETRIAL SERVICE. 
ARR scheduled for 12/26/91 at 1:30 
12/26/91 ATTY BRUCE OLIVER CALLED FOR DEF. DEF REQ 
SEEK COUNCIL. ATTY OLIVER ANTICIPATES DEF RETAINING HIM AS ATTY. 
ATTY WILL CONTACT LAYTON CRT IF HE ENTERS HIS APPEARANCE AS 
COUNCIL. DEF WILL APPEAR 1/2/92 IF NOT ATTY OBTAINED. 
ARR on 12/26/91 was cancelled 
ARR scheduled for 1/ 2/92 at 1:30 P in room 2 with RSD 
12/30/91 FILED: A/C BY ATD OLIVER & TRJ DEMAND-
ARR on 1/ 2/92 was cancelled 
01/06/92 FILED: INMATE RELEASE SHEET, BOOKING INFO, INTERVIEW SHEET-
01/13/92 FILED UTAH ARREST & COURT FILING/DISPO RPT DTD 12-22-91-
01/14/92 PTC SET W/ATD OLIVER. DOCKET & CITATION TO CPR. DOCKET TO ATD-
PTC scheduled for 3/18/92 at 1:30 P in room 2 with RSD 
02/05/92 REC'D MO TO CONTINUE - TO JUDGE DUTSON -
02/06/92 MO TO CONTINUED SIGNED BY JUDGE DUTSON-
CPR WILL BE OUT OF TOWN AT A TRAINING CONFERENCE ON 3-18-92; 
THEREFORE, PTC HAS BEEN RESCHEDULED AS FOLLOWS: 
PTC rescheduled to 4/ 1/92 at 11:00 A in room 2 with RSD 
& DEF-
JUDGE: DUTSON, ROGER S. 
828 
CY OF DOCKET TO ATD, CPR, 
34/01/92 Hearing: 
TAPE: 439 COUNT: 
Deft Present 
ATD: OLIVER, D BRUCE JANENE 
with RSD 
3 JURY 
PRO: ELLER. 
TRJ scheduled for 05/20/92 at 0900 A in room 2 
JURY TRIAL SET FOR 5/20/92 AT 9:00 AM. NOTED: THERE ARE 
TRIALS SET ON THIS DATE. 
15/15/92 FILED: INFORMATION FROM CPR OFFICE 
'5/20/92 Trial: JUDGE: DUTSON, ROGER S. 
TAPE: 456 COUNT: 45 
Deft Present 
ATD: OLIVER, D BRUCE PRO: ELLER, JANENE 
#223 DEF ATY OLIVER REQ TO ENVOKE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE, REQ 
GRANTED, #233 DEF OBJECT TO OFFICER REMAINING IN CRT ROOM, CRT 
GRANTS EXCLUSION RULE WITH EXCEPTION OF OFFICER, #355 INFORMAT 
CBF 
CBF 
CBF 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
RFW 
RFW 
RFW 
SDM 
RFW 
RFW 
SDM 
SDM 
SDM 
SDM 
SDM 
SDM 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
BL 
SECOND CIRCUIT UUUKT - J_,AwuiN 
Defendant Citation. 
WEIHERT, KARL JOHN 
05/20/92 GIVEN TO DEF ATY, #370 JURY BROUGHT IN CRT RM, #450 JUDGE ADDRES Bl 
JURORS, #495 JURORS SWORN, CPR AND DEF ATY INTRODUCES THEMSELVES Bl 
#566 JURORS INTRODUCED, #980 JURORS INSTRUCTED AS TO LAW AND Bl 
FEELINGS REGARDING DUI, #1198 CPR QUESTIONS PROSP JURORS, #1244 Bl 
ATY OLIVER QUEST PROSP JURORS, #1511 CPR AND DEF ATY CHALLENGES B] 
JURORS #1795 JURORS SELECTED: DIANE MCKINNIS ALMA SCHMIDT Bl 
DONNA HIGGINS MARCIA GUNDERSON Bl 
#1880 JURORS SWORN #1895 JURORS INSTRUCTED NOT TO SOCIALIZE OR Bl 
TALK ABOUT CASE #1960 CRT IN RECESS, #1982 DEF ATTY REQ MO. TO Bl 
DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF IMPROP FILING #2084 CPR REBUTTALS ABOUT BL 
IMPROP FILING WITH MAGISTRATE NOT REVIEWING FILING. JUDGE KRB BL 
OKAYED INFORMATION TO BE FILED, #2131 RSD STATES CITATION WAS BL 
FILED AND CPR WILL SIGN INFORMATION IN COURT, #2157 ATTY OLIVER BL 
STATES CITATION NOT SUFFICIENT AND WAIVER NOT AUTHORIZED, IMPROP BL 
COMMENCED AND DISMISSAL #2205 INFORMATION SIGNED BY CPR IN OPEN BL 
CRT #2250 OBJECTIONS TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS BY DEF ATTY BL 
#2490 CRT REVIEWS STATUTE REGARDING PRESUMPTION, #2556 NOT OBJEC BL 
OF JURY INSTRUCT BE CHANGED, #2588 OBJECT TO PAGE BEING STRICKEN BL 
#2705 ISSUE OF DUI DESCRIPTION TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT EL 
#2751 OBJECT TO JUROR ALMA SCHMIDT'S HEALTH PROBL #282 6 CRT BL 
DENIED MO TO STRIKE SCHMIDTS & WHITECAR #28 59 FORMAL INFORMATION BL 
FILED BUT FILED AFTER JURY PICKED #2895 JURY INSTRUCTIONS BL 
GIVEN TO JURY ***NEW TAPE** #457 #10 OPENING STMT BY PLA #121 BL 
RESERVE OPENING REMARKS #135 PLA CALLS PW#1 #140 PW#1 OFFICER BL 
JIM KEITH SWORN AND TESTIFIES #170 OBJECT DATY TO JOB RELATED BL 
TRAINING, OBJECT SUST #185 OBJECT DATY TO JOB RELATED TRAINING BL 
ANSWER TO REMAIN #238 OBJECT DATY TO HEARSAY, ANSWER STRIKEN AND BL 
ANSWER TO DISPATCH CALL ONLY #462 OBJECT DATY TO INFO AFTER STOP BL 
SUSTAINED #526 OBJECT TO CONCLUS FROM OBSERVATION, #539 OVERRULE BL 
DEF TO TELL WHAT OBSERVED AND NOT DRAW CONCLUSION #632 OBJ DATY BL 
REQ PW#1 TO REF TO NIGHT IN QUESTION NOT GENERAL, #655 OVERRULED BL 
#748 DATY REQ PW#1 TO TESTIFY FROM OWN RECOLLECTION NOT FROM BL 
NOTES. DEF SO DIRECTED BY CRT #1142 OBJ DATY RELAVANT TO BL 
LINE OF QUEST #1183 BOTH COUNSEL APPROACH BENCH #1277 JURORS BL 
EXCUSED FOR LUNCH #1323 CPR CONTINUES TO QUEST PW#1 BL 
#159 6 DEF ATY QUEST PW#1 BL 
REGARDING QUALIFICATION TO TESTING #1963 NOTHING FURTHER BL 
#1870 CRT ALLOWS PW#1 TESTIMONY ADMITTED ONLY LIMITED TO PROFER BL 
BEING MADE ON PERSONAL OBSERVATION, TESTING TO BEFORE & AFTER BL 
ALC CONSUMPTION. #2024 CPR REBUTTALS ON CORALATION BETWEEN BL 
ALC IN SYSTEM AND HORIZ GAZE #2066 OBJ OVERRULED BL 
#2125 PW#1 RESUMES TESTIMONY #2251 OBJECT TO ANSWER. CRT ALLOWS BL 
ANSWER BUT NO FURTHER #2344 PW#1 IDENTIFIES DEF #2540 OBJ-STRIKE Bl 
TESTIMONY REG RIGHTS #3640 QUESTION RESTATED #2653 JURY TO Bl 
DISREGARD TESTIMONY #2762 OBJECT TO FOUNDATION OF QUEST #2873 Bl 
OBJECT TO TESTM FROM P EXHIBIT-DOCUMENT NOT ENTERED YET AS EXHIB Bl 
#2920 PW#1 TO NOT DISCLOSUE CONTENTS OF EXHIBIT UNTIL PROPER Bl 
TIME #3217 OBJECT DATY #3235 ATY OLIVER REDIRECTS PW#1. OFFICER Bl 
NOT QUALIF TO TEST TO INTERPRETATION OF TEST RESULTS #2 2 64 OBJ B] 
OVERRULED #3445 CPR OFFERS P-3 AS EXHIBIT. DATY OBJECTS TO EXHIB B] 
***NEW TAPE*** 458 DATY STATES OBJECT 1) ONE PAGE SIGNED 1/24/92 B] 
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH EVENT TIMING (CHRIS CORING AFIDAVT) 2)AVIDA B] 
9:18 i 
D10872U 
Traffic Court Case 
x^ ^ U R 1 - juAi^oN THb^oDAY OCTOBER 8, 199 
9: 18 A 
Defendant Citation: D108720 LPD Case: 912007007 TC 
WEIHERT, KARL JOHN Traffic Court Case 
05/20/92 OF BREATH TECH CONTAINS HEARSAY/CONCLUSIONS #425 OBJ TO AFIDAV BL 
ONLY 3) AFIDAVIT EXECUTED IN DAGETTE COUNTY #490 SUBMIT AFIDAV BL 
WERE NOT EXECUTED IN TIMELY MANNER. AFIDAV IS NOT RELIABLE #534 BL 
RESPONSE BY CPR #626 CPR RESTATES OBJ TO DATY UNTIMELY OBJ BL 
#674 DATY ARGUES CONTENT OF AFIDAVIT #964 CRT FINDS AFIDAVIT BL 
WAS EXECUTED IN COMPLIANCE AND REGULAR COURSE OF OFFICERS DUTIES BL 
#1285 CRT FINDS AFIDAVIT IS TRUSTWORTHY AND OBJECT IS OVERRULED BL 
#1319 RECESS #1330 DATY CONCERNED WITH ATTENTIVENESS OF JUROR BL 
SCHMIDT, WILL CONTINUE #1377 JURY BROUGHT BACK IN #1440 EXHIBIT BL 
P-3 ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE , CPR REQ TO ENTER EXHIBIT 1 & 2, BL 
RESERVE OBJ ON P EXHIBIT 1 & 2 FOR LATER TIME, #1520 OBJ TO BL 
INSTRUCTED TO ANSWER QUEST #1567 XEX BY DATY PW#1 #2987 DATY BL 
OBJ TO HEARSAY ON CAR SEARCH, JURY TO DIS-REGARD ANSWER #3085 BL 
COUNSEL APPRO BENCH #3129 JURY EXCUSED #3140 RECESS BL 
#376 OBJ TO ADMISSION OF EXHIB 2 #390 PL EXHIBIT 2 SHOWN TO PW#1 BL 
#445 D-4 EXHIBIT MARKED FOR DEF #459 DATY OFFERS D-4 EXHIB #469 BL 
EXHIB ENTERED, EXHIBT P-2 AND D-4 DIFFER IN INFORMATION #524 BL 
CPR QUEST PW#1 ***NEW TAPE 459*** 531 OBJ TO QUEST, DEF TO ANSWE BL 
#572 DATY OBJ TO P-l EXHIBIT BEING ENTERED #616 OBJ OVERRULED BL 
#671 OBJ TO LACK OF QUALIFICATION TO ADMINISTER TEST ON EXHIBIT BL 
P-2 AND NOT INSTRUCTED IN TESTIMONY INSTRUCTION #720 CPR RESPOND BL 
#752 EXHIBITS 1 & 2 ENTERED #770 OBJ DATY TO ALC CONSUMP AND BL 
ACETONE PRESENCE #840 CPR RESPONDS TO BREATH TEST #874 OBJ BL 
DUE TO WEIGHT AND NOT ADMISSIBLE. #946 EXHIB D-4 ENTERED UNDER BL 
STIPULATION #960 DATY RESUMES XEX #1204 DEMOSTRATION ON P-2 EXHI BL 
IF CARBON PAPER #1289 NO FURTHER #1292 REDIRECT BY CPR BL 
#1358 OBJ TO QUEST OF BREATH TEST ON ACETONE READING #1384 QUEST BL 
WITHDRAWN AND JURY DISREGARD LAST QUEST #1406 NO FURTHER BY CPR BL 
#1413 PW#1 STEPS DOWN #1432 CPR CALLS PW#2 #1445 PW#2 OFFICER BL 
JOHN LYBERT SWORN AND TESTIFIES #1583 PW#2 IDENTIFIES DEF #1595 BL 
OBJ ACCUMULATIVE TESTIMONY #1614 OBJ OVERRULED #1773 NO FURTHER BL 
BY CPR #1779 XEX BY DATY #2014 NO FURTHER BY EITHER SIDE #202 3 BL 
CITY RESTS #2068 DEF ATY REST #2078 COUNSEL APPROACH BENCH BL 
#2115 EXHIBITS GIVEN TO JURY #2132 CRT ADDRESS JURY REGARDING BL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS #2295 ARGUMENT BY CPR #2846 DE ATTY OLIVER ARG BL 
***NEW TAPE*** #403 CPR CLOSING ARGUMENT #525 CRT ADDRESSES JURY BL 
DELIB. #611 JURY RETIRES TO DELIBERATE BL 
#622 JURY RETURNS #635 JURY HAS REACHED VERDICT #640 JURY FINDS BL 
DEF GUILTY AS CHARGED, #655 JURY POLLED AND VERDICT IS UNAMIOUS BL 
#749 WAIVE TIME FOR SNT #776 DATY ADDRESS CRT REGARDING SNT BL 
CRT ENTERS JUDGMENT GUILTY AS CHRGED BL 
SNT: BL 
TAPE: 460 COUNT: 1145 BL 
Judge: DUTSON, ROGER S. BL 
Chrg: DUI Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju BL 
Fine Amount: 650.00 Suspended: .00 BL 
Jail: 30 DAYS Suspended: 30 DAYS BL 
Community Service: 2 DAYS in lieu of jail. BL 
Fines and assessments entered: FN 52 0.00 BL 
SB 130.00 BL 
Total fines and assessments..: 650.00 BL 
DEF LEAVES AREA ORDERED TO REPORT NEW ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND BL 
EGOND CIRCUIT L.UUK1 - UAI._,JM 
9:18 AI 
lefendanc Citation: D108720 LPD Case: 912007007 TC 
WEIHERT, KARL JOHN Traffic Court Case 
)5/20/92 PAY FINE. DEF TO COMPLETE COUNSELING THRU ALC PROGRAM THRU BL~ 
HAFB IF APPROVED PROGRAM THRU STATE. DEF TO PAY $100 PER MONTH BL 
1ST PMT END OF JUNE AND END OF EACH MONTH THEREAFTER. DEF TO BL 
DO 24 HRS COM SERVICE. IF APPEAL IS IN FUTURE, PROBABLE CAUSE BL 
HEARING COULD BE HELD. BL 
Probation Agency Information: BL 
LAYTON CIRCUIT COURT BL 
425 N WASATCH DRIVE BL 
LAYTON, UT 84041 BL 
Phone: (801) 546-2484 BL 
Conditions of Probation: BL 
NO VIOLATIONS, EXCEPT MINOR TRAFF, SPEC NO LIKE CHARGES BL 
PAY FINES AND ASSESSMENTS BL 
ATTEND AND COMPLETE ALCOHOL PROGRAM BL 
12 MONTHS PROBATION TO THE COURT BL 
DO NOT DRIVE UNLESS LEGAL AND INSURED BL 
REV scheduled for 12/23/92 at 0300 P in room 2 with RSD BL 
06/22/92 FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL SWF 
CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE IS MAILED TO COURT OF APPEALS. SWF 
Began tracking Appeal Review on 07/22/92 SWF 
06/29/92 FILED: FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS—NEW CASE # 920394-CA KAE 
07/15/92 Hearing (REVIEW HEARING): JUDGE: DUTSON, ROGER S. BL 
TAPE: 491 COUNT: 2180 BL 
Deft not present BL 
ATD: OLIVER, D BRUCE PRO: ELLER, JANENE BL 
ATY OLIVER REQ CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE BE ISSUED AND STAY BL 
OF EXECUTION UNTIL APPEAL. CRT TO SET HRG ON PROBABLE CAUSE. BL 
STAY GRANTED TILL AFTER HRG. BL 
07/21/92 HRG scheduled for 9/23/92 at 2:00 P in room 2 with RSD BL 
07/22/92 REC'D: ORDER (THAT SNT BE STAYED TIL REV BY CT OF APPEALS,MO FOR DKM 
CERT OF PROB CAUSE, MO & ORDER FOR PREP OF TRANSCRIPT. TO RSD- DKM 
07/30/92 ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE DUTSON- RFW 
PER REQ OF ATD, TAPES SENT TO PENNY C ABBOTT, TRANSCRIBER- RFW 
08/17/92 DOCKET TO ATD PER REQUEST- DKM 
08/19/92 FILED: ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT FROM PENNY C ABBOTT, CSR- RFW 
TAPES RETURNED FROM TRANSCRIBER- RFV, 
08/20/92 COPY OF TRANSCRIBER'S COVER LETTER SENT TO COURT OF APPEALS- RFV 
Appeal Review date changed to 11/01/92 RFV 
08/28/92 RFW T/CD CT OF APPEALS. NOTHING NEEDED FROM CT OR CPR THIS DATE- RFV 
09/08/92 FILED: COPY OF DOCKETING STATEMENT SENT BY ATD TO CT OF APPEALS- RFV 
09/16/92 CLERK CONTACTED ATY OLIVERS OFFICE REG HRG ON 9/23/92. HRG TO BL 
BE CANCELLED. BL 
HRG on 9/23/92 was cancelled BL 
10/07/92 SHERRY, CT OF APPEALS, T/CD. REQ'S TRANSCRIPTS & FILE- RFt 
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mnting Summary 
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tional Case Data 
Total Due 
650.00 
Paid Credit Balance 
650.00 
Time Pay# 
Sentence Summary 
1. DUI 
Fine amount: 650.00 
Jail: 30 DA 
Community Service: 2 
Parties 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Suspended: 
Suspended: 30 DA 
DA 
00 
Find: Guilty - Jury 
Atty for Defendant 
OLIVER, D BRUCE 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, 
SUITE #260 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Home Phone: ( 
Work Phone: ( 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 11/22/63 
Dr. Lie. No.: 0 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
JURY TRIAL 
REVIEW HEARING 
REVIEW HEARING 
backing Status 
Appeal 
State: UT Expires: 
on 04/01/92 
on 05/20/92 
on 06/17/92 
on 12/23/92 
1100 A in room 2 with RSD 
0900 A in room 2 with RSD 
03 00 P in room 2 with RSD 
0300 P in room 2 with RSD 
Review Date 
11/01/92 
;nd of the docket report for this case. 
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MONS AND CITATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOF 
I ^.>>\-Vn» ir m 
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
I NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
A - t o t J O 
5) nor more than (14) days after issuance 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
EVICTION 
.SUSPENDED. 
.SUSPENDED. 
4 
f D No Contest 
I • Not Guilty 
Agency . 
ISSUING
 t 
ENFORCEMENT /
 A ^ J 
AGENCY ^ " ^ ro* 
NAME V P-O. I i / (L9St) 
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etc . i fu 3 A I 
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First) 
CASE 
NO. 4/0 
6M1 
CITATION NO. '%-
D108720 / 
Driver License No. 
Vehicle Make 
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ICity) 
es [State ^Ftest 
ll47\Wm\ 
T ^ 
Middle) 
(State) 
Expir
H-JU42I 
/ehicle Type 
d ^ 
?Sa 
Re riction 
( • I ; Soci 
Color 
DOB 
JIJ4£3 
iaJ Security No. 
hoHO * 
Height Weight ' Eyes Sex Vehicle License No. State Expires ^ 
A ' / " Ufin lUW I/IA l/VKgrBA I M- lfe«f,% 
Vehicle Make Vehicle Type Year Color Accident Comm. Vehicle Haz. Material Direction of Traver s 
Accident Comm. Vehicle 
DYes ^ o 
[Motorcycle 
DYes OQlo 
Haz. Material 
DYes XQ\o 
Direction of Traver 
r<g)E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
• UTAH CODE D COUNTY CODE^f^CITY CODE NO.: ^f/-^^1/ 
ON THE $ 2 * DAY QF _ MILITARY TIME / $ & J 
LOCATION $<IOo / / <m**'n . MILE POST NO 
VIOLATION(S): f)u. 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE fioo^J- Q<L<£o 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PUBSyANT TO SECTION 77-7-19, U.C.A. 
OFFICER 
COMPLAINANT 
7' fatf .BADGE NO. Po*f-DATE OF CITATION 
COURT COPY ONE 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET NO. 
>O*T - n . IN THE COURT 
JRT'RM. *2 LAYTON 
) W. STATE ST. 
mNGTON, U T .
 C0UNTY 0 F DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ 
LAYTON * ORDER RELEASING DEFENDANT, 
• ^ 
VS * PROMISE TO APPEAR, 
WEIHERT. KARL JOHN * AND WAIVER OF EXTRADITION 
* 
endant No. 9 1 6 4 3 9 * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ 
THE SHERIFF OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: WHEREAS the above named 
fendant has been duly charged with QUI 
D WHEREAS just cause has been shown to the above entitled Court, you 
e hereby ordered to release the above named defendant from the Davis 
unty Jail without bail subject to the following conditions, orders, 
c , if any: APPEAL TN COURT THURSDAY. DECEMBER 29. 1991 at 1:00 P 
0 G E
 REAM B Y MARY S, fiOBB 
Pretrial Service Officer 
PROMISE TO APPEAR AND WAIVER OF EXTRADITION 
the above named defendant, hereby promise to appear in the above 
:itled Court on the ?6 day of DECEMBER , 19 91 , 
1:00 P.M. M # * fur"ther promise to appear before the appropriate 
irt, as instructed, until the charges against me have been dismissed 
I have been sentenced, I understand that should I fail to appear as 
itructed and promised, or if I fail to comply with the above 
iditions, orders, etc., if any, my release will be revoked and I will 
returned to custody and confinement. I further understand and agree 
t should I fail to appear and I am apprehended outside the state of 
h I waive extradition proceedings in order that I might be returned 
this Jurisdiction, and I agree to pay reasonable costs incurred in 
sing my return to custody. 
CERTIFICATION 
bhe above named defendant, hereby certify that I have read the above 
nise to Appear and Waiver of Extradition; that it has been explained 
me, and that I fully understand said Promise to Appear, Waiver of 
radition, and agreement to pay costs in the event that I fail to 
*ar. 
Dated this 23 day of DECEMBER
 # 19 91 m 
Defendant Witness 
>RM 512 (09-06-91) 4 Part White-Court / Yellow-Defendant / Pink-Booking File / Gold-PT^ Fii. 
1 received a copy of the Information this morning, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Bailiff, we're going to have the 
3 jury step out for just a minute more. I'm sorry. We have a 
4 preliminary matter. 
5 MR. OLIVER: Just received a copy of the 
6 Information this morning. It was apparently filed with the 
7 Court on May 15th at 3:55 p.m., which was on Friday of this 
3 week past. And the bottom of the Information says this 
9 Information is based upon evidence obtained from the 
10 following witness: Donald J. Keith, and that ls signed by 
JJ Janene H. Eller, Layton City Prosecutor. 
12 Then the next line, I—is scratched out, and put 
13 "filed this 15th day of May, 1992," Circuit Judge is crossed 
14 out, and I don't know who signed this. I don't read—I 
15 can't read the signature, but that's neither here nor there, 
16 The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, 
17 Section 13 requires that offenses heretofore required to be 
18 prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by Information 
19 after examination and commitment by a magistrate. This was 
20 not sworn to before a Judge nor authorized by a Judge. 
21 I think that even technically speaking and I'll 
22 raise the argument now commensurate therewith, but the 
23 important thing is that they be commenced by the commitment 
24 of the—examination and commitment by the magistrate rather 
25 than being filed in the middle of a case. I think the 
29 
> a z 
Q < O 
z 
2 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2\ 
22 
23 
24 
25 
filing is inadequate, but I think that"s really the crux of 
my motion to dismiss is that this has not been presented to a| 
magistrate and authorized for filing. And that's improper 
and totally improper and we would move to dismiss the case. 
THE COURT: City? 
MS. ELLER: Yes. He's correct, it was not sworn 
to before the Judge. I—I was informed by the clerk that an 
Information had not been filed in this case. I came over anc'l 
met with Judge Bean, who indicated thait due to—because of 
amendment, I'm not sure if it's to a rule or statutory 
requirements, that they no—these Informations no longer 
need to be sworn before the Judge. And so based on that 
information from Judge Bean, I signed the Information and 
filed it at that time. 
If the Court wants to give me a minute, I'm sure 
that I can find a reference to the amendment. 
THE COURT: Well, there is a new rule on that; 
however, in order to have the proper record here, I'd 
indicate that the citation itself appears to have been 
filed by the Court—or with the Court quite some time ago, 
it's in the file itself. And I would allow the State or 
the City at this time to sign the Information under oath, 
or to verify it under oath, and I would even subscribe, the 
new rule in the event there is any problem with prior 
offenses, I think it's more of a technical, procedural 
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matter than anything else; so would you raise your right 
hand, please? 
MR. OLIVER: Judge, before you do that— 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. OLIVER: — i f I may just address briefly— 
THE COURT: Yes. ; 
MR. OLIVER: —what the Court has just raised. 
11-1-21, Utah Code Annotated indicates that the 
citation is not sufficient. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. OLIVER: As a matter of fact, to proceed on 
the citation requires— 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. OLIVER: Well, I appreciate that, but I still 
would like to make it for the record. 
The 11-1-15 requires that a waiver be had prior 
to proceeding on the citation, that waiver has not been had, 
definitely Mr. Weihert nor myself, neither one, has waived 
that in writing, and do not waive that. And the very fact 
that the prosecution must be commenced is not technical, 
it's a Constitutional requirement. 
THE COURT: I — 
MR. OLIVER: And as such, the appropriate remedy 
at this point in time is to dismiss because it's been 
improperly commenced and we're here improperly before the 
31 
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 J Court, and the appropriate remedy is to dismiss the case, 
2 !
 THE COURT: I understand your position. 
Now, would you raise your right hand, please, and, 
4
 be sworn? 
5
 J Do you solemnly swear that the facts set forth 
in this Information are true and correct to the best of 
7
 I your knowledge, so help you, God? 
8 MS, ELLER: I do. 
9
 THE COURT: Would you sign again where you have 
10 already signed? 
11 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, not knowing how far the 
12 Court is going to go with regards to the jury instructions 
13 I at this point in time, I do have some objections and if the 
Court anticipates—excuse me--anticipates reading those to 
15 I the—the entirety to the jury at this time, I would like to 
16 address that. 
17 J THE COURT: Okay. This might be a good time t o — 
to make the objections, also to have the—your position 
concerning the jurors that— 
20 I MR. OLIVER: Oh. T h e — 
21 THE COURT: — t h a t you had asked be excused for 
22
 cause, put that on the record so we have the record. 
23 MR. OLIVER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. The 
24 instructions are not numbered, so I'm referring to the 
25
 instruction that has at the top of the page a G, It says, 
32 
14 
18 
19 
1
 A The actual breath sample was administered at 1912, 
2 which would be 7:12 p.m. 
3
 Q And do there appear to have been any alterations 
4
 made to those documents that you filled out at the time you 
5 gave the test to Mr. Weihert? 
6 A No. 
7 MS. ELLER: Your Honor , I ' d l i k e t o o f f e r 
8 P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t 3 which i s custodian c e r t i f i c a t e and 
9 in toxi lyzer t e s t and a f f idav i t regarding the in tox i lyze r 
10 machine. 
11 THE COURT: Has defense counsel seen that? 
12 MS. ELLER: He has. 
13 MR. OLIVER: I've seen them just briefly, your 
14 Honor. Do have some objections to them. 
15 THE COURT: All right. We will have a very brief 
16 removal of the jurors while we discuss a legal issue here 
17 and you1re again advised not to discuss the case until you 
18 go into the jury room to finally discuss it. 
19 MS. ELLER: Your Honor, if Mr. Oliver's objection 
20 goes to the admission of those—that affidavit and ultimately] 
21 to the other documents that are before Officer Keith, then I 
22 would have an objection to him raising that objection at 
23 this time. I would like to go forward with that. 
24 THE COURT: Well, let's go ahead and hear what the 
25 objection is at this point. What is your objection? 
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1
 MR. OLIVER: May I approach the bench, your Honor? 
2
 I THE COURT: Yes. 
3
 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held 
4
 at side bar.) 
5 MR. OLIVER: With regards to Exhibit P-3, I think 
6
 there are a couple of significant (inaudible). Point 3, 
7 which is the stan—the standards for chemical breatn analysis 
8 the evidence. Under this, and I have perused this today 
9 specifically in conjunction with this case— 
10 THE COURT: 41-6-44.3? 
11 MR. OLIVER: Thatfs correct, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead-
13 MR. OLIVER; It says, the Department of Public— 
14 the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall 
15 establish standards for the administration and interpreta-
16 tion of chemical analysis of a person1s breath, including 
17 standard of training. 
18 Now, first thing, those standards are not availably 
19 here and we don't know what the standards are; but going on 
20 to Paragraph 2, says, in any action or proceeding in which 
21 it is material to prove that a person was operating or in 
22 actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
23 influence of alcohol or any drug, or operating with a blood 
24 or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents 
25 offered as memorandum or record of acts, conditions or 
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1 events to prove that the analysis was made and the instr'ument 
2 used was accurate according to standards established in 
3 Subsection 1 are admissible if, and then it goes on and says, 
4
 No. 1, the Judge finds that they were made in the regular 
5 course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
6 condition or event* 
7 Dealing specifically with Subsection A, there are 
8 several objections. First off, one of the pages, and there 
9 are apparently three pages to Exhibit 3, one of the pages to 
10 Exhibit 3, signed by Sergeant Christian Kooring w^s signed 
11 on the 24th of January, 1992. Taking on its face that this 
12 incident occurred on December 22nd, 1991, that's clearly, 
13 what is it, 32, 33 days after the incident. And therefore, 
14 based upon the fact that this is executed at least 32 days 
15 after, it can't comply with—that it has to be made in the 
16 regular course of the investigation at or about the time of 
17 the act, condition or event. Can't comply with that. So 
18 consequently, that's a specific thing— 
19 THE COURT: Well, let me—let me interrupt you 
20 briefly so I understand your position. Your position is 
21 that a certification made by the sergeant by 30 days or so 
22 after the incident in question, certifying certain records 
23 from on or about this occasion does not comply with Subsectio|n 
24 1? 
25 MR. OLIVER: W e l l , y o u r H o n o r , c e r t a i n l y t h a t ' s 
110 
my position, but I would state further that one of the 
things, and I want to address it a little bit further than 
that; but I hadn't indicated exactly which one that was, as 
far as which document was represented by this one signed by 
Sergeant Chris Kooring. 
THE COURT: Until I see it, of course, I canft 
really understand the argument, s o — 
MR. OLIVER: I understand. 
THE COURT: — i f we've got copies or something so 
that I can follow you, then that— 
MR. OLIVER: This is all I've got, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: I don't know if there's a copy— 
MS. ELLER: I apologize* I don't believe I have a 
copy, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead then. Go ahead. 
MR. OLIVER: The—at any rate, so consequently, the 
interesting thing is that it has to be in the regular course 
of the investigation. Now, obviously, what Chris Kooring-*-
what Sergeant Chris Kooring is doing here is not in the 
regular course of the investigation. The investigation is 
well completed at that time; the reports are submitted, 
everything's done, and Chris Kooring is not a part of the 
investigation. So the reports must be conducted in the 
regular course of the investigation; this is not done in the 
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1 regular course of the investigation. 
2 Now, T would anticipate that- then Counsel's going 
3 to suggest that it comes in under 803-6 as a routine thing 
4
 for business exceptions, but that's only if he's here to 
5 testify, and then the records that he's testifying about, 
6 not an affidavit in his place, can come in. And so 
7 consequently, when we look at 803-6 as a business record 
8 exception, which Sergeant Chris Kooring's not here to testify 
9 to the fact that these are indeed kept, he's submitted his 
10 affidavit in lieu thereof. 
11 And I've reviewed Murray City vs. Hall in anticipa-
12 tion of this, and Murray City vs. Hall only deals with the 
13 technicians' affidavits, not with anything else. And I 
14 would submit to the Court that that is what was anticipated 
15 when this provision was written into the law in 41-6-44.3, 
16 that it was anticipated to be the technicians' affidavits, 
17 and I still think that the technicians' affidavits are 
18 defective on their face and I will address that in a moment; 
19 but nonetheless, I think that that's what's anticipated, 
20 not a whole series of things that may follow thereafter that 
21 obviate certain burdens of proof that the State has simply 
22 by submitting an affidavit. That is not the intent of the 
23 statute, that is not the intent of the Commissioner of 
24 the Department of Public Safety's rules and regulations, 
25 they deal specifically with the breath-testing device, not 
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1 I • 
with the keeping of records 
2
 ' And so consequently, the affidavit of Chris 
Kooring under the circumstances is inadmissible, simply 
because it doesn't fit anything. 
5
 | And with regards to the business record exceptions 
under 80 3-6, it says records of regularly conducted activity 
7
 It says a memorandum, report, record or data compilation in 
8 any form of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses 
9 made at or near the time by or from information transmitted 
10 by a person with knowledge—we're talking about documents 
11 that are made at that time of the incident, the time of the 
12 breath test—if kept in the course of regularly-conducted 
13 business activity and if it was the regular practice of that 
14 business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, 
15 data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
16 custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of 
17 information or the method of circumstances of preparation 
18
 indicate lack of trustworthiness. Okay? 
19 So, unless there's a—it's admissible under this 
20 exception unless there's an indication of lack of trust-
21 worthiness. I think there is an indication in this 
22 particular case, which I'm going to argue in just a moment, 
23 but the important thing is, it has to be the testimony of 
24 the custodian or other qualified person. 
25 And in this case, all we have is an affidavit, and 
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1 so consequently, it doesn't fit under the exception as 
2 provided in 41-6-44.3, doesn't fit under the exception as 
3 provided in 40—in 803-6, Utah Rules of Evidence, nor does 
4 it fit under 803-8, because under 803-8, it specifically— 
5 8(b) says, matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by 
6 law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding 
7 however, in criminal cases, matters observed by police 
8 officers or other law enforcement personnel. 
9 So this is a matter, Sergeant Christian Kooring, 
10 Breath Testing Supervisor, Utah Highway Patrol, it's a 
11 matter observed by a police officer, and therefore, in a 
12 criminal matter, is not admissible. 
13 Now, I make the same argument with regards to the 
14 affidavits of the technician, but specifically the argument 
15 that I'm making now goes to only this affidavit of Chris 
16 Kooring. And so with regards to this affidavit of Chris 
17 Kooring, it's not the exception as provided for in statute, 
18 it's not guaran—it's not provided for by the Commissioner 
19 of the Department of Public Safety in his rules and regula-
20 tions, standards and policies, it's not covered under 80 3-6 
21 because he's not here to testify and it's not covered under 
22 803-8 because this is a criminal proceeding and this is a 
23 police report which is kept and observed by a police 
24 officer; therefore, it would be specifically excludable. 
25 So therefore specifically to the affidavit of 
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Chris Kooring, we would object to that. 
Then with reqards to—may I just for a moment— 
3 I well, then with regards to the affidavit of the breath 
4 technician, I would indicate that I think that 803-8(b) 
5 specifically excludes this, recognizing that there's been an 
6 exception under 41-6-44.3; but I think that the affidavit 
7 J of the technician in this case, who is Ronald Ellsworth, a 
certified breath technician, is—contains hearsay* Not 8 
9 only does it contain hearsay, it contains conclusions of law 
which would be prohibited in a standard affidavit under 
Rule 5 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
It would be the position, as a matter of fact, 
Utah Criminal Code—and I don't have 76—well, I do, I've 
got part of 76; the Utah Criminal Code in, 1 think it's 
76—76-1-501, says a defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
18 | Now, that's the standard in a criminal proceeding. The 
standard in a civil proceeding is a—by a preponderance, 
simply the 5 0 percent or 51 percent rule. Affidavits which 
21 | would not be acceptable in the 50 or 51 percent rule, the 
22 I preponderance, certainly would not be acceptable when we 
23 , have to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
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Now, affidavits may be acceptable under 41-6-44 
if done properly; but when done, containing aspects of an 
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affidavit which would not be admissible in a civil case 
should absolutely not be admissible in a criminal case, 
since the burden is far greater in a criminal matter. The 
standard should be far greater, that the adherence of that 
affidavit should conform to what—what the rules of evidence 
would require and what 76-1-501, or was it 2-501 would 
require, the burden of proof. 1-501. 
And so thereunder, the--and the specific 
provisions of the affidavit with regards to Ron Ellsworth 
that I'm objecting to are that he makes a conclusion that 
says this is the official record and notes of this proceaure 
which were made at the time these tests were done, that's 
for this Court to determine and that is—that—if we rely 
solely on the face of the affidavit, that obviates the 
Court's responsibility under A. 
THE COURT: But I could disagree with it, couldn't 
I, if I examine— 
MR. OLIVER: There's noth—there's no way that I 
can produce anything that's going to allow you to disagree, 
except in this particular case, and I'll show the Court 
something that will allow it to disagree; but routinely, 
that statement makes the affidavit inadmissible. Okay. 
The fact that' he says he's competent to testify is 
a conclusion of law. That it was done, let's see, that it's 
done in accordance with the standards established by the 
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1 Commissioner of Utah, Department of Public Safety, that!s a 
2 I conclusion, these are all conclusions that we donft have the 
opportunity to look behind, 'cause we don't have the facts 
to look behind it. A properly constituted affidavit and a 
properly constructed affidavit would give us the facts and 
allow us to draw the conclusions from the facts. That's not 
what's happening here. They're telling us what we have to 
believe, not giving us the facts and allowing us to draw our 
own conclusions as is the purview of this Court, to make 
findings as to whether or not indeed these facts exist. We 
don't have the facts upon which to base it. 
And so all we have to rely on is the conclusions, 
strike the conclusions and the affidavit goes out the window 
because it doesn't comport with the requirements of 41-6-44.3 
Leave them in and it totally takes away from the Court the 
opportunity to examine the facts and find—make the finding 
of facts and the conclusions which are required for the 
admission of the affidavit. 
So, based upon the Constitution of these affidavits 
specifically, we're objecting to these affidavits, and I 
want that clear, I'm not objecting to 41-6-44.3, nor an 
affidavit that would comply with the requirements therein; 
only with a defective affidavit to begin with. My argument 
does not go to the right of confrontation, r want that 
specifically understood. I'm going to content only and J 
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1 admiss ib i l i ty of a f f i d a v i t , not to the r ight of confrontation] 
2 Now, s p e c i f i c a l l y one of the findings that th i s 
3 Court must make in order to have these admissible i s tha t 
4 in 2-(a) of 41.6-44.3 says , the Judge finds that they were 
5 made in the regular course of the inves t iga t ion at or about 
6 the time of the ac t , condi t ion or event and, then i t goes 
7 on and s a y s . . . 
8 I would like to point out to the Court if I may, 
9 point to Counsel first, okay. 
10 MS. ELLER: Well, what is it that you're pointing 
11 out? Ifm sorry. 
12 MR. OLIVER: The affidavit was executed in Daggett 
13 County, your Honor; Daggett County is at minimum three hours 
14 away from Layton, Utah, and as such, this affidavit could 
15 not have been executed in accordance with what the Court 
16 has to find; that is, the Judge finds that they were made 
17 a t — i n the regular course of business, or in the regular 
18 course of investigation at or about the time of the act, 
19 condition or event. 
20 And furthermore, I would say thatfs if Trooper 
21 Ellsworth got in his vehicle and drove straight from here up 
22 to Daggett County. We have no idea what transpired between 
23 the time the test was conducted here or whatever h e f s — 
24 he's affining to; we have no idea what happened between here 
25 and there, and what the time element is on that. And so 
118 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 consequently, I would submit that the irregularity of the 
? affidavit itself indicates that it was not done at or about 
3 the time of the event for which the affidavits are prepared. 
4 Wasn't even—except for the fact that Trooper Ellsworth says 
5 so, in a conclusionary type way, we don't even—from the— 
6 from the notary public side of that, we don't really know a 
7 whole heck of a lot because it creates—creates a lot of 
3 confusion in my mind as to why it's notarized in Daggett 
g County, when the test is administered in Davis County, 
theoretically in Layton, unless the machine was in Lay— 
unless the machine was in Daggett County. I don't know. We 
have no answers to these things. 
And the affidavit on its face raises substantial 
questions and substantial problems. The admission of the 
affidavit is inadmissible—or the—the--is not acceptable, it 
is inadmissible, based upon 41-6-44.3, 806—or 803-6, 
803-8(b) and on its face, it's just unreliable. And that's 
19 
20 
23 
24 
25 
18 one of the things that the Court has to find is that it's 
reliable. And I see nothing to help us to get from Davis 
County to Daggett County, and that, on its face, destroys the 
21 | reliability of the document 
22 I THE COURT: Response? 
MS. ELLER: I've also reviewed Murray City vs. Hall 
and the Supreme Court of Utah specifically stated in that, 
recognized Section 41-6-44.3 as a codification of the findingb 
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1 matter, so go ahead and— 
2 MR. OLIVER: Just briefly, your Honor, I'd indicate 
3 to the Court that Ms. Eller did not address the reliability 
4 aspect of this that was raised by the location of signing 
5 of the affidavit. She didn't even address that, and Murray 
6 City vs. Hall only goes to the technicians' affidavits, and 
7 it addresses it very specifically. 
8 And as the Court reads through the four points, 
9 the first three points were correct that Ms. Eller cited; but 
10 the fourth point is the reliability which I think that the 
11 Daggett County notary brings into question the reliability 
12 of this particular affidavit. I think there's a substantial 
13 question on its face as to its reliability. But Murray City 
14 vs. Hall does not address the custodial affi—or the 
15 custodian's affidavit. 
16 And I read specifically 803-6 which requires 
17 testimony from the custodian, not an affidavit from the 
18 custodian. And while the purpose of the statute as is 
19 espoused by Murray City vs. Hall may be one of economy, I 
20 guess if we really wanted to, we could say, gee wilikers, 
21 anybody who is arrested is guilty because we don't want to 
22 waste the Court's time, money or the officer's time or money 
23 or the prosecutor's—that's not what they're doing. What 
24 they're doing is that the—they're deeming that the machine 
25 is basically reliable provided that the technician does as 
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he's supposed to, then the results are admissible. That's 
2 I what they're attempting to determine. They're not trying to 
3 obviate a defendant's rights in a trial. What they're 
4 trying to do is they're trying to say, you can challenge 
5 this and you can spend five days challenging this, and 
6 every time we challenge it, we can have expert testimony, 
7 and we can do this and we can do this, and the burden can 
8 become overwhelming on the system, and this and that, and as 
9 long as the officer does what he's supposed, as long as the 
10 machine's deemed reliable, then the affidavits are 
11 admissible, when they comply with certain things. 
12 And in this case, I'm not arguing about the right 
13 of confrontation. That's what Murray City vs. Hall is about 
14 is the right of confrontation, and I'm not arguing the right 
15 of confrontation. I'm arguing content of affidavit. And 
16 there's a world of difference between right of confrontation 
17 and content of affidavit. 
18 I have, in civil matters, in domestic matters, go 
19 in to the Court with the individual sitting in the courtroom 
20 that executed the affidavit and if the affidavit is 
21 improperly prepared, the affidavit is inadmissible. Now 
22 that person can still testify, that person can still verify 
23 the content of that affidavit, but do so in the appropriate 
24 fashion because the content of the affidavit must be 
25 admissible as evidence in Court. Conclusions wouldn't be 
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1
 admissible. 
2
 If I objected and if he says, I did them in 
3
 J conformance with the standards of the Commissioner of the 
Department of Public Safety, I would object, and I would 
say, let's see what those are and let's find out exactly 
6 what you did, that's a conclusion and I want to know what 
1 you did to comply with that, and this Court would sustain 
8 my objection and would then make Trooper Ellsworth testify 
9 to the steps that he followed and why it was in conformity 
10 with the standards. 
11 This affidavit so—totally bypasses that and doesn' 
12 give us anything to rely on. It just says, I did it, believe) 
13 me, I did it. That would not be admissiblein any Court as 
14 testimony, as would none of the other three provisions that 
15 I've indicated; competent to testify. He may well be 
16 competent to testify, but that's a determination to be made 
17 in this courtroom, not by anybody else, anyplace else. 
18 That's a self-serving statement that goes to his own ends. 
19 And so whether it's under 41-6-44,3, whether 
20 it's on the face of the affidavit, whether it's under 8 0 6 — 
21 or 803-6 or 803-8(b), it's not admissible on its content, 
22 not on the right to confrontation, Murray City vs. Hall 
23 disposed of the right to confron—right of confrontation. 
24 And now we're talking about, not the right of confrontation, 
25 we're talking about content. And this Court must rule that 
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the content must be admissible as evidence, and if it's not, 
then the affidavit is not admissible. 
3
 And lastly, and I'm just going tq--itls almost a 
4
 restatement again and I apologize, but I just want to re-
's emphasize the fact, I still don't know where Daggett County 
6 comes from in this matter. I have absolutely no idea 
7 whatsoever; but to me, on its face, that creates a question 
8 of reliability. 
9 THE COURT: I don't think anyone can read Section 
10 41-6-44.3 and Murray vs. Hall together without recognizing 
11 that the legislature and the Supreme Court have approved a 
12 method of allowing certain evidence into a trial in a manner 
13 that is somewhat unusual, and there1s--there's an intent 
14 here, obviously, to allow the legislature to shortcut, as it 
15 were, some of the procedural aspects, but gives to the trier 
16 of fact a very important responsibility of determining 
17 whether based upon the affidavits, and I have to acknowledge,] 
18
 they're somewhat of a bootstrapping process that is provided 
19 for in Murray vs. Hall and the statute; but the ultimate 
20 responsibility of the trier of fact is to determine that the 
21 one of the findings is that the method and circumstances of 
22 the preparation of the documents were such to—as to ipdicat^ 
23 their trustworthiness. 
24 That leaves, of course, an interesting issue 
25 raised by defense counsel of an affidavit by Christian 
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 Kooring, Sergeant, custodian, signed in—on January the 
2
 J 24th as a certification that these records are correct. And 
I read that affidavit as only being a certification of the 
intoxilyzer tests being part of the official records, and 
5
 specifically rule that that is not prohibited under the 
6
 intent of 41-6-44.3, even though I do find that the affidavit 
7
 J of Christian Kooring, the breath testing supervisor at the 
Utah Highway Patrol was not made in the regular course of 
9
 the investigation, but that it was made at or about the 
10 time that it says it was made. And you—you can reserve that) 
11 issue for—for appeal, if you feel itfs an appropriate issue 
12 to appeal; but I do find that on the face of that affidavit, 
13 that it is what it purports to be, that is, that it was made 
14 out on the 24th day of January, 1992, and he certified as to 
15 the statements contained therein and some of them are legal 
16 conclusions, or at least conclusions that there were 
17 J regulations in effect and that these records are done in 
accordance with those regulations. And I'll allow you to 
make that argument at a higher court if you feel strongly 
enough about it, because I believe the intent of 41-6-44.3 
21 I is to allow these documents in, if I find that they 
22 otherwise are reliable. 
23 Now, as to the argument that they do not occur 
24 necessarily at the time of the investigation, I read that 
25
 section more broadly than that where the language says at or 
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1 about the time of the act, condition or event, and I'm 
2 reading that as meaning the event that these people are 
3 swearing occurred, and that it does not have to be at the 
4 time of this particular investigating officer's investiga-
5 tion 
6 MR. OLIVER: No, I wouldn't suggest—just if I may 
7 just interrupt the Court; I'm not suggesting that it has to 
8 be done contemporaneously with the officer's investigation. 
9 I don't think that's the intent of 41-6-44.3, and if I made 
10 the Court believe that that's— 
H I THE COURT: Well 
12 i MR. OLIVER: — m y argument, I back off, I would 
13 J specifically state that the affidavit of Ron Ellsworth has 
14 I to be prepared contemporaneously, as according to Murray 
15 
16 
City vs. Hall, with his conduct. 
THE COURT: Yes. Yes. And that raises then 
17 I another issue. He states on one of the affidavits that on 
18 December 19th at 11:35, he performed tests on the machine to 
19 determine if it was accurate, certify that it was done and 
20 that it was—and the machine was accurate cit that time and 
21 on the 19th of December, 1991, in Davis County, in front 
22 I of Colleen Abate, or Abate, the clerk--I know that's the 
clerk out of Clearfield Court that—this is a matter of 
knowledge, that she certified that it was done i n — i n — o r 
23 
24 
25 he c e r t i f i e d i t was done i n f r o n t of h e r on t h a t same d a y . 
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It looks to me as though, the way I construe what 
happened on the second page of the affidavit is that on 
January the 20th, 1992, he, at 9:40 a.m., he certifies that 
he tested the machine again. He did not swear to that, 
however, until the next day. And I believe that although he 
swore to it in Daggett County and it was the next day, that 
that is in substantial compliance with the requirements of 
41-6-44.3. 
In looking at these documents, I—they appear 
that the calibration and testing of the machine was done 
pursuant to the standards established by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety, if I admit Kooring's affidavit in, and 
then the other affidavit of Ron Ellsworth, and that, I 
believe, is the intent of the statute. And that these 
affidavits were prepared in the regular course of these 
public officers1 duties and that they were prepared contem-
poraneously with the act, condition or event that they 
purport to be certifying to. And in reasonable proximity to 
those times; finding that specifically the one affidavit 
was not signed until a day later by Ronald Ellsworth, he 
asserts that he did the test on January 20th at 9:40 a.m., 
but did not swear to that until January the 21st. He 
certifies that the intoxilyzer was at the Layton Police 
Department when he tested it and then he certified to that 
apparently when he was in front of a notary that resides in 
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1 Manila, Daggett County, and he swore to that on the*21st 
2 day of January, and I would find that he probably swore to 
3 it in Manila, Daggett County as a—that's how I would have 
4
 to construe this particular record. And I find that that 
5 is reasonably contemporaneous with the act, condition or 
6 event that he is certifying. 
7 I further find that the source of this information 
8 from which made, and the method and circumstcinces of the 
9 preparation are such as to indicate trustworthiness. That 
10 being the intent of the statute and Murray vs. Hall, 
11 therefore, I would overrule your objection on that basis. 
12 Do you have further objection to Plaintiff's 
13 E x h i b i t 3? 
14 MR. OLIVER: None , y o u r Honor . 
15 THE COURT: Al l r i g h t . L e t ' s have a very b r i e f 
16 r e c e s s , w e ' l l c a l l the j u r y back i n , and take about a t h r e e -
17 minute recess. 
18 (Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
19 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, there was one concern that] 
20 I wanted to bring before the Court. And--
21 THE COURT: You may be seated. 
22 MR. OLIVER: Mr.--Mr. Schmidt, I don't know if 
23 the Court's noticed or been aware of it, and I really don't 
24 know what or whatnot; but he seems not to be paying a whole 
25 heckuva lot of attention. I've looked at him several times 
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and he's staring straight ahead, looking at neither of the 
speakers, staring straight ahead and just almost in a daze, 
so to speak. And—are we on the record? And I'm just a 
little concerned about his attentiveness and whether or not 
he actually is being attentive to the trial. I—I don't 
know how to determine that, except that I would like the 
Court to pay attention to that and notice it and indeed, 
see if the Court feels the same way I do. 
THE COURT: I hav.e been watching Mr. Schmidt, and 
I saw him in the hall out here, just before I came in and I 
asked him how he was feeling, just as I was coming through/ 
and he said he was feeling okay. So, I will continue to 
observe him. I have been keeping my eye on him. 
All right. Call the jury in. 
(Whereupon, the jury returned to the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Would the Counsel come forward and 
I'll give you copies of these instructions that we've— 
THE BAILIFF: All rise. 
THE COURT: All rise. 
You may be seated. 
We'll discuss those later. 
MS. ELLER: Where were we? 
THE COURT: Plaintiff had offered Exhibit 3 into 
evidence, and we had a hearing on the admissibility of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and it has been reviewed by the Court 
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1
 and the Court reached certain findings during the hearing 
2 out of the presence of the jury. Those are made a part of 
3 the record, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 is admitted. 
4
 MS. ELLER: Okay. And based on that, we would 
5 also offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and 2. 
6
 MR. OLIVER: We'd reserve objection on that, 
7 your Honor, until we have the opportunity to cross-examine. 
8 THE COURT: All right. We'll reserve ruling on 
9 the admissibility of Exhibits 1 and 2 at this time. 
10 Q (By Ms. Eller) After you gave Mr. Weihert the 
11 breath test, did you appraise him of his Constitutional 
12 rights per Miranda at that time? 
13 A Yes. I did. I read them right off of this sheet 
14 as I checked them off to him. 
15 Q All right. And did he make any statements to you 
16 after he'd been Mirandized at that time? 
17 A He did agree to answer some questions and I did 
18 ask him the questions on this form pursuant to the 
19 inves t iga t ion . 
20 Q What questions did you ask him at that time? 
21 A I asked him specifically, Were you operating a 
22 vehicle? He responded, Yes. I then asked him, Where were 
23 you doing? He said, Going home. What street or highway were 
24 you on? I do not know. What direction of travel were you 
25 going? He said westbound. 
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